Walters v. De’Andrea and Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., [Ms. 1190062, June 5, 2020] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2020). The Court (Mendheim,
J.; Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, Stewart, and Mitchell concur; Bryan,
J., concurs in the result; Bolin and Shaw, JJ., dissent) reverses the
Montgomery Circuit Court’s summary judgment conferring State-agent
immunity on Montgomery Police Department (MPD) Patrol Officer Jessica
De’Andrea for claims asserting that she struck Walters’s motorcycle
from the rear with her patrol vehicle as both were waiting for a red light
to change. The officer testified that at the time of the accident, she
had completed her patrol duties and was returning to headquarters to turn
in her paperwork in conformance with MPD policy. Ms. *2.
The Court holds Officer De’Andrea was not entitled to immunity, explaining
“A government employee sued for a tortious act committed in the line
and scope of his employment may, in an appropriate case (i.e., where the
employee has breached a duty he owes individually to a third party), be
sued individually.”
Wright v. Cleburne Cty. Hosp. Bd., Inc., 255 So. 3d 186, 191 (Ala. 2017). The
Wright Court provided as an example that “a driver on an errand for his
employer owes an individual duty of care to third-party motorists whom
he encounters on public roadways.”
Id.
The
Cranman Court itself observed: “As an example, there should be some recognizable
difference in legal consequence between, on the one hand, a prison warden’s
decision not to fire or not to sanction the entity contracting with the
State Department of Corrections to provide medical services and, on the
other hand, a decision by the driver of a pickup truck on how to drive
through or around potholes while transporting prisoners. Each situation
involves judgment or discretion. Under our recent cases, the warden is
immune [citing
Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1998),] and the truck driver is not [citing
Town of Loxley v. Coleman, 720 So. 2d 907 (Ala. 1998)].”
Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 404 (emphasis added). The duty at issue here – “the
conduct made the basis of the claim against [De’Andrea]” –
was nothing more or less than the duty of due care that every driver on
the roadway owes to other motorists.
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. Under
Venter and other authorities, such an action is not clothed with State-agent immunity.
Ms. **16-17.