Iskra and Singh v. Bear Roofing, LLC, [Ms. SC-2023-0524, June 14, 2024] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2024). The Court (Stewart, J.; Parker, C.J., and Wise and Sellers, JJ., concur; Cook, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result), reverses the Jefferson Circuit Court’s summary judgment dismissing claims asserted by Joe Iskra and Rani Singh (“the Iskras”). The Iskras alleged they were third-party beneficiaries of a home-repair contract and associated express warranty between Bear Roofing, LLC (“Bear”) and Kenneth Vinoski.
The Court reiterates the long-standing Alabama rule that “‘[t]o recover under a third-party beneficiary theory, the complainant must show: 1) that the contracting parties intended, at the time the contract was created, to bestow a direct benefit upon a third party; 2) that the complainant was the intended beneficiary of the contract; and 3) that the contract was breached.’ Sheetz, Aiken & Aiken, Inc. v. Spann, Hall, Ritchie, Inc., 512 So. 2d 99, 101-02 (Ala. 1987).” Ms. *7, some internal quotation marks omitted.
In reversing, the Court concludes “the Iskras presented evidence, from both Vinoski and Bear, indicating that Bear had been made aware that Vinoski had requested its services to repair deficiencies noted on an inspection report prepared in connection with the intended sale of the house [to the Iskras]. Much like in Rumford [v. Valley Pest Control, Inc., 629 So. 2d 623 (Ala. 1993)], the repairs were clearly in contemplation of the sale of the house, after which Vinoski would derive no benefit from the repairs. As a result, the Iskras presented evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bear intended to bestow a direct benefit upon them…” Ms. **9-10.
The Court also reverses the summary judgment on the Iskras’ breach of express warranty claim because “[t]here was evidence indicating that the warranty was meant to cover prospective purchasers, such as the Iskras, without being conditioned on a preclaim transfer of the warranty.” Ms. *12.