Leader and Durall v. Crescencio Pablo, etc., [Ms. SC-2022-0736, Aug. 30, 2024] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2024). The Court (Mendheim, J.; Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, and Mitchell, JJ., concur; Cook, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result; Bryan and Stewart, JJ., concur in the result) reverses the Jefferson Circuit Court’s $3 million bench verdict in a co-employee wrongful death suit against William Durall and dismisses the appeal of Leader who abandoned his appeal as a result of having been discharged from the judgment in bankruptcy.
Plaintiff Crescencio Pablo alleged and the circuit court implicitly found “that Durall willfully and intentionally removed or disabled the electronically interlocking limit switch from the security gate on Line 3, Godet 1, and also that Durall willfully and intentionally trained Estillado to bypass the security gate and cut wraps off the rollers in Godet 1 while they were operating at production speed.” Ms. *24.
The Court distinguishes Bailey v. Hogg, 547 So. 2d 498 (Ala. 1989) and holds “although Line 3 was manufactured with the at-issue safety device, there is nothing to indicate at what point the safety device was uninstalled, there is no evidence indicating that Durall knew that the security gate on Godet 1 should have been electronically interlocked with a limit switch, and there is no evidence indicating that Durall willfully and intentionally chose not to install the safety device…The circuit court erred in determining that Pablo presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Durall willfully and intentionally removed the at issue safety device on this basis.” Ms. *38.
The Court rejects Pablo’s argument that training to bypass a safety device is equivalent to removal:
In the present case, as in Williams [v. Price, 564 So. 2d 408 (Ala. 1990)], the complained of “removal” was an instruction pertaining to safety procedures, mainly an instruction to Estillado to lift the security gate on Godet 1 and cut the wraps off of the rollers therein. Based on this Court’s precedent in Williams, such conduct does not constitute the ‘removal’ of a safety device under § 25-5- 11(c)(2), and, thus, the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise. Ms. **45-46.