Crenshaw, etc. v. Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc., [Ms. SC-2024-0081, Dec. 6, 2024] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2024). The Court (Bryan, J.; Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur; Mitchell, JJ., concurs specially; Cook, J., recuses) affirms the Butler Circuit Court’s summary judgment dismissing Derrick Crenshaw’s (“Crenshaw”) negligence action on behalf of his minor daughter Iyana Crenshaw (“Iyana”) injured on the job at Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc..
The Court rejects Crenshaw’s argument that the exclusive remedy provision of the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) violates Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022. The Court first determines that “we will apply both the vested-rights approach and the common-law-rights approach in determining whether the Act violates § 13.” Ms. *21.
The Court holds that “[u]nder the vested-rights approach, Crenshaw’s constitutional challenge clearly loses. Iyana’s workplace injury occurred after the Act became law. Thus, Crenshaw did not have a vested right in a cause of action when the Act was enacted. Under the vested-rights approach, the Act does not violate § 13 because the Act does not deprive Crenshaw of a vested right in a cause of action.” Ms. *22.
The Court further holds
Crenshaw’s constitutional challenge also fails under the common-law-rights approach. Under the common-law-rights approach, the Act “‘will survive constitutional scrutiny if one of two conditions is satisfied:
“‘1. The right is voluntarily relinquished by its possessor in exchange for equivalent benefits or protection, or
“‘2. The legislation eradicates or ameliorates a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise of the police power.’”
Reed [v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102, 115 (Ala. 1988)] (quoting Fireman’s Fund, 394 So. 2d at 352 (Shores, J., concurring in the result)).
Ibid.
The Court acknowledges that “with the exception of the narrow opt-out provision in § 25-5-50(b), the Act allows an employer to opt out of coverage but does not allow an employee to do the same.” Ms. *26. However, this does not render the Act invalid “under the common-law-rights approach, [because] the Act is constitutional if either of that test’s two conditions are satisfied. Reed, 527 So. 2d at 115. Because the second condition, i.e., the police-power condition, is easily satisfied here, we pretermit discussion of the first condition.” Ms. *27.
Quoting extensively from Judge Terry Moore’s Workers’ Compensation treatise, the Court concludes that the legislature acted within its police power in enacting the Act by removing defenses to common law claims asserted by an employee injured on the job while simultaneously “… insulat[ing] the employer from wasteful litigation and extravagant verdicts. The Act dispenses with most of the issues of liability and damages that prompted employers to incur litigation costs in defense of common-law actions.” Ms. *35, quoting 1 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers’ Compensation § 2:7 (2d ed. 2013)(footnotes omitted).
Justice Mitchell’s special concurrence asserts:
I see nothing in the text or history of Article I, § 13, to suggest that it was intended to freeze traditional common-law remedies.… Rather, Article I, § 13, appears to exist to preserve the independence of the courts and to ensure that justice is not arbitrarily denied. Nothing more. And if Article I, § 13, does not limit the Legislature’s ability to alter common-law remedies, then the “common-law rights” approach to interpreting Article I, § 13, may be unfounded. Because we must “interpret the Alabama Constitution … in accordance with its original public meaning,” Barnett v. Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 766 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., concurring specially), this may indicate that we should abandon the “common-law rights” test going forward.
Ms. **41-42 (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).