Huggins v. Linger, [Ms. CL-2023-0654, Oct. 25, 2024] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). The court, in a per curiam decision (Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur; Lewis, J., concurs in the result), affirms in part and reverses in part the Monroe Circuit Court’s order approving the final settlement of the conservatorship of Vernon Charles Huggins and ratifying two earlier partial settlements that had been approved by the Probate Court of Monroe County prior to removal to circuit court.
Section 26-5-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides that “the conservator must, at least once in three years, file in the court of probate an account of his or her guardianship, accompanied with the vouchers showing his or her receipts and disbursements ….” (Emphasis added.) In pertinent part, § 26-5-4, Ala. Code 1975, provides that, on the day set for the hearing regarding the partial settlement, “the court must proceed to examine the vouchers and to audit and state the account, requiring evidence in support of all such vouchers or items of the account as may be contested or as may not on examination appear to the court to be just and proper ….” The conservator did not submit to the court written receipts or releases supporting the accounting of either the partial or final settlements. Ms. **5-7.
The court rejects the conservator’s argument that “the term ‘vouchers’ should be given a broad definition such as ‘evidence or proof’ rather than a narrow legal definition such as a receipt or release confirming payment of a bill or debt either by the ward’s estate or to the ward’s estate,” Ms. *14 , and “conclude(s) that a ‘voucher’ for purposes of the Act is a receipt or release verifying payment of a bill or debt either by the ward’s estate or to the ward’s estate.” Ms. *19.
The court reverses the approval of the final-settlement petition because it “did not satisfy the requirement of § 25-5-8 that it be accompanied by vouchers…,” but affirms the judgment ratifying the partial settlements because “there is no statutory basis to reexamine them on the ground that they were not supported by vouchers and, even if there were such a basis, [the appellant] waived her objections on that ground by failing to file an objection to them in a timely manner.” Ms. **19-20.