Marina v. Bama Reinforcing, LLC, [Ms. SC-2024-0142, Nov. 8, 2024] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2024). In a per curiam opinion, the Court (Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur; Mitchell, J., dissents, which Wise and Sellers, JJ., join) reverses the Madison Circuit Court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of Bama Reinforcing, LLC, dismissing a negligence action filed by Londell Marina, Jr. arising from a workplace accident in which Marina was injured when he stepped on a piece of a metal “chair” bar used in reinforcing concrete when pouring a slab.
Marina was employed by Fessler & Bowman, a general contractor hired to perform concrete work in the construction of a new FBI building at Red Stone Arsenal in Huntsville. Fessler & Bowman hired Bama Reinforcing to perform the rebar installation. Ms. *2.
The Court first rejects Bama Reinforcing’s argument that Marina was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Court reiterates:
“[Q]uestions of negligence incorporate factual evaluations that are almost always within the province of the jury. … It follows that a summary judgment based on the doctrine of contributory negligence is seldom proper.” Gulledge v. Brown & Root, Inc., 598 So. 2d 1325, 1330 (Ala. 1992).
“To establish contributory negligence as a matter of law, a defendant seeking a summary judgment must show that the plaintiff put himself in danger’s way and that the plaintiff had a conscious appreciation of the danger at the moment the incident occurred. See H.R.H. Metals, Inc. v. Miller, 833 So. 2d 18 (Ala. 2002); see also Hicks v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 211, 219 (Ala. 1994). The proof required for establishing contributory negligence as a matter of law should be distinguished from an instruction given to a jury when determining whether a plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence. A jury determining whether a plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence must decide only whether the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care. We protect against the inappropriate use of a summary judgment to establish contributory negligence as a matter of law by requiring the defendant on such a motion to establish by undisputed evidence a plaintiff’s conscious appreciation of danger. See H.R.H. Metals, supra.” Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839, 860-61 (Ala. 2002).
Ms. **11-12 (emphasis in the original). The Court contrasts “[t]he small piece of chair” Marina stepped on with photographs of metal chairs and other construction debris on the concrete slab and concludes whether “Marina was contributorily negligent was clearly an issue for the jury to determine….” Ms. **14-15.
The Court likewise rejects the trial court’s conclusion that Bama Reinforcing was not responsible as a matter of law for leaving the piece of chair on the slab. The Court explains the controlling principles of proximate cause as follows:
There is a logical sequence in the evidence indicating that only Bama Reinforcing used chairs, that its employees had worked in the same area the day before Marina’s accident, and that it had a clear duty to clean up that area upon the completion of its work. Thus, the evidence points to Bama Reinforcing’s negligent cleanup being the reason the piece of chair was left on the ground in the work area for Marina to step on. That Fessler & Bowman’s employees also could be included in the causal chain because the job site had not been cleared of all debris and rubbish throughout the workday before Marina’s accident does not exonerate Bama Reinforcing.
“‘The general rule is that it is no defense, in actions for injuries resulting from negligence, that the negligence of third persons contributed to cause the injury to the plaintiff if the negligence of the defendant was an efficient cause, without which the injury would not have occurred. Stated differently, where a defendant is guilty of negligence which causes an injury, and the plaintiff is free from negligence contributing thereto, the fact that the negligence of a third person also contributed does not relieve the defendant from liability for his negligence.’” Williams v. Woodman, 424 So. 2d 611, 613 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Watt v. Combs, 244 Ala. 31, 37, 12 So. 2d 189, 195 (1943)).
Ms. **23-24.