Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Harrington; Harrington v. Exxon Mobil Corp., [Ms. SC-2023-0401; SC-2023-0424, Jan. 10, 2025] __ So. 3d __ (Ala. 2025). In a plurality opinion, the Court (SC-2023-0401 - Stewart, J.; Parker, C.J., and Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur; Mendheim, J., concurs in the result, which Mitchell, J., joins; Cook, J., concurs in the result, which Wise, J., joins; Sellers, J., dissents; SC-2023-0424 - Stewart, J.; Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur) affirms the Mobile Circuit Court’s denial of Exxon Mobil Corporation’s motion for a new trial in a maritime injury case in which the jury awarded Adam Harrington one million dollars.
The trial court granted Harrington’s motion in limine invoking the collateral source rule under maritime tort law and excluded evidence that Harrington’s medical bills had been paid by his employer’s workers’ compensation insurer. The trial court ordered the parties could offer evidence of the amount of medical expenses billed as well as the amount ultimately paid and accepted by the medical providers but that “[t]he source of any payment is prohibited by the collateral source rule.” Ms. *4.
Exxon moved for a new trial arguing that the trial court erred in applying the maritime tort collateral source rule and should have applied § 12-21-45, Ala. Code 1975, “as a neutral rule of evidentiary procedure … compatible with maritime law.” Ms. *10. The main opinion emphatically rejects this contention, “[a]lthough § 12- 21-45 is a statute that, in part, addresses evidentiary procedure regarding admissibility and discovery, because it modified Alabama’s common-law collateral-source rule, it is also substantive law.” Ms. **10-11.
The main opinion also rejects Exxon’s alternative argument that Harrington opened the door to this evidence when on cross examination, his life-care expert referenced both third-party payors and negotiated discounts of retail medical charges:
To the extent that it referenced third-party payors, Dr. Brock’s testimony arguably violated the trial court’s previous ruling barring evidence of collateral source payments. However, Exxon’s purported rebuttal testimony – that Harrington’s employer’s workers’ compensation insurer had paid his medical expenses – would not have rebutted, cured, or neutralized Dr. Brock’s testimony: rather, it would have served to emphasize and expound upon Dr. Brock’s collateral-source testimony. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in refusing to admit the collateral-source-payment evidence under the curative admissibility doctrine.
Ms. **19-20.